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Recent empirical studies have shown that the structure of the legal system
and the eﬃciency in law enforcement inﬂuence the ﬁnancial structure of the
ﬁrm, their ability to gain access to capital markets, and the growth rate of
economic systems. This paper uses a simple banking model with ex-ante and
ex-post information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders to analyse
the eﬀects that the eﬃciency of the legal system may exert on the credit
market. Its main conclusions are: (i) an eﬃcient legal system reduces loan
interest rates and, in the majority of the cases, the average amount of defaults
on loans; (ii) an improvement in the eﬃciency of legal institutions improves
banks’ selection procedures only provided the eﬃciency of the legal system
is already high.
Keywords: Judicial enforcement of laws, information production, stochas-
tic debt contracts.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, K41, K42.1 Introduction
When ﬁrms borrow, they entitle investors to a ﬂow of payments (in ﬁxed or
variable amounts) which will be paid in the future as a reward for an amount
of money granted today. For this transaction to be suﬃciently attractive,
so that entrusting one’s ﬁnancial resources to someone else is deemed eco-
nomically worthwhile, these rights must be protected, in order the ﬁrms’
managements do not dissipate the money collected, but remunerate outside
investors fairly1.
Investors ﬁnance ﬁrms because their rights are protected by the law. The
degree of protection of creditors’ rights depends on many aspects: the eﬃ-
ciency of the legal and judicial system, the transparency degree of accounting
rules, the costs of the access to the judicial system, the rapidity and certainty
of courts’ rulings, and so on. However, when information is incomplete and
asymmetrically distributed and transactions are costly, protecting creditors’
rights is an extremely costly and inevitably incomplete process. Those in-
tending to ﬁnance a ﬁrm must therefore always spend some resources on
gathering the information required to select the best applicants, i. e. those
least likely to require legal action or recourse to some other form of credit pro-
tection. As the degree of protection of creditors’ rights grows stronger, how-
ever, the incentives for creditors to screen and control debtors may become
weaker, and this may increase on average the riskiness of ﬁrms (investment
projects) ﬁnanced. In other words, to some extent information production
and legal protection may be substitutes.
1This issue have been widely explored by literature on “property rights”, “corporate
governance” and ”optimal bankruptcy procedures”. For complete surveys on these lit-
eratures see Bebchuk (1997), Hart (1995, 1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Schwartz
(1998).
1The intimate linkages between law and ﬁnance are actually the center of
a wide-ranging debate initiated by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999 henceforth LLSV). These authors show that the
legal ‘family’ (Anglo-Saxon, French, German or Scandinavian) to which a
legal system belongs, the content of laws, and the quality of law enforcement
inﬂuence not only the degree of protection aﬀorded to creditors’ rights, but
also the performance of capital markets. In particular, LLSVs’ compara-
tive studies depict a situation in which ‘common law’ countries (i. e. those
with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition) provide stronger protection for investors
than do ‘civil law’ countries (i. e. those with a German, French or Scan-
dinavian legal tradition). This feature may help to explain why countries
belonging to the ﬁrst group have more developed ﬁnancial markets, more
concentrated ownership, and higher equity returns than do those belonging
to the second one (Lombardo and Pagano, 1999). Levine (1998, 1999) and
Beck et al. (1999) have extended the analysis to the banking system, not-
ing that countries with more stringent enforcement of contracts and closer
creditor protection are also those with more developed banking systems and
a higher economic growth rates (both in terms of per-capita GDP and per-
capita productivity)2. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan
and Zingales (1998) have employed a cross-country statistical approach to
show a strong positive correlation between the eﬃciency of the legal sys-
tem and the growth of ﬁrms (or industries) dependent on external ﬁnance.
Lastly, Cecchetti (1999) ﬁnds that the diﬀerences among legal systems have
a substantial eﬀect on monetary policy transmission channels.
2Other papers focusing on the inﬂuence of legal institutions and property rights en-
forcement on economic development as well as on the corporate performance are Scully
(1988), Gray (1991), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mueller and Yurtoglu (1999).
2The working of legal and judicial systems may be very diﬀerent not only
from country to country, but also among regions belonging to the same law
system. Usually, creditors’ protection is more eﬀective in the industrialized
regions than in the backward ones. So, for instance, from a survey recently
carried out by the Bank of Italy on a large sample of Italian banks, it was
found out that in Southern regions (the so called ’Mezzogiorno’) the prac-
tices for debt collection both through executive and bankrupcty proceedings
take much more time (ﬁve additional months, in the case of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and over ﬁfteen additional months in the case of personal estate
executive proceedings) than in Centre or Northern regions, and the share of
debt seized is sometimes also lower (Table 1). Moreover, the same survey
showed that the diﬀerence in the length of debt collection is due essentially
to an insuﬃcient functioning of the law courts in Southern regions that, in
turn, draws local creditors to rely on obstructionistic conducts (Table 2).
[Insert Table 1 and 2]
Going through this new literature law and ﬁnance, one could infer a
clear-cut relationship between the eﬃciency of the legal system, the degree
of protection accorded to creditors’ rights and the sound performance of ﬁ-
nancial markets. The underlying idea seems to be that the more creditors
are protected, the more debtors tend to behave accordingly to creditors’ in-
terests, thereby making it easier for an entrepreneur to get external funding3.
However, as Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1998, p. 13) point out, “incentive
problems also arise on the creditor’s side”. More eﬀective protection of cred-
itors’ interests means that they have less incentive to screen and to control
3Following this line of reasoning, Fabbri (2000) shows that a better judicial enforce-
ment of laws mitigates moral hazard problems, reducing credit rationing phenomena and
increasing the level of investment.
3their counterparts, which suggests that a more eﬃcient legal system is not
necessarily associated with better credit allocation.
This paper presents a banking model which assumes that the eﬃciency
of the legal and judicial system aﬀects screening costs as well as the results
of monitoring (in terms of money recovered by banks) of bankrupted ﬁrms.
More speciﬁcally, it considers a one-period competitive credit market charac-
terized by both ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information between banks
and ﬁrms, both of which are assumed to be risk-neutral.
Banks are unable to observe either the entrepreneurs’ ability or the out-
come of their investment projects. Entrepreneurs, indeed, may be of two
types: the good ones, who can choose between two investment projects which,
though they involve diﬀerent levels of risk, are both of positive net present
value; and the bad ones, who are able to implement only one type of project
with a negative net present value. The number of good entrepreneurs in
the economy is such that, from the banks’ perspective, a randomly selected
(from the original population) entrepreneur is endowed with a negative net
present value investment project. Thus, the credit market may exist only
if banks use some creditworthiness tests to screen their customers. These
tests allow banks to discriminate between types of entrepreneur. Despite the
care taken in performing these tests, banks commit evaluation mistakes with
a frequency inversely proportional to the amount of resources spent on that
activity. The eﬃciency of the legal system inﬂuences both the screening costs
and the amount of loans granted to defaulting ﬁrms which the banks are able
to recover through bankruptcy proceedings.
The main results obtained are the followings: (i) the optimal debt con-
tract is a stochastic standard debt contract according to which banks monitor
only a portion of ﬁrms announcing default; the frequency of monitoring is
4inversely related to the eﬃciency of the legal system; (ii) an increase in the
legal system eﬃciency has contrasting eﬀects on the optimal level of informa-
tion production by banks: on the one hand, by reducing screening costs, it
makes it more proﬁtable for banks to increase the thoroughness of screening;
on the other, by heightening the eﬃcacy of bankruptcy procedures, it makes
a careful selection of applicants less important; when the legal system is
highly ineﬃcient the negative eﬀect on screening incentives prevails, whereas
if creditors’ claims are already adequately protected, the positive eﬀect on
screening incentives predominates; (iii) a large share of non-performing loans
may be the result not only of the low ability of entrepreneurs but also of
a legal and judicial system unable to enforce creditors’ claims satisfactorily;
(iv) an improvement in eﬃciency of the legal system gives rise to a reduction
in loan interest rates and thus induces entrepreneurs to choose safer projects.
This paper draws from diﬀerent research areas. Firstly, as just said, it
refers to the debate on the extent to which the eﬃciency of capital markets
and ﬁrms’ investment choices depend on the protection given to creditors by
bankruptcy procedures. In line with this literature, we ﬁnd that there is a
trade-oﬀ between creditors’ protection and the riskiness of externally ﬁnanced
projects or the level of speciﬁc investments undertaken by ﬁrms4. However,
here we endogenize the average probability that ﬁnanced ﬁrms will default
(and therefore ﬁle for bankruptcy), supposing that banks committ errors in
evaluating applicants and that the frequency of these errors depends on the
amount of information produced in screening them.
The issue of ex-ante information production by banks has been widely
explored in models based on information externalities on the credit market
4Among others see papers by Bebchuk and Picker (1998), Berkovitch, Israel and Zender
(1998).
5(Broecker, 1990; Riordan, 1993; Chiesa, 1998; Gehrig, 1998). These studies
analyse the relation between competition on the loan market and the thor-
oughness with which banks screen their applicants. They show the existence
of a ‘winner’s curse’ dilemma, whereby more competition generally induces
lenders to produce less information, with the consequence that the percent-
age of ”bad” loans increases. Manove et al. (1998), instead, point out the
negative inﬂuence of debt collateral guarantees on the incentive for banks to
produce ex-ante information5. In contrast to these studies, in our model the
statistical properties of the screening technology are derived endogenously
(as in Gehrig, 1998). Moreover, the coexistence of both ex-ante and ex-post
asymmetric information allows endogenous determination of the debt con-
tract form as well, while also taking into account, as suggested by Stephen
and Gillanders (1993), the consequences of post-contractual monitoring costs
on the pre-contractual screening activity.
Finally the eﬀect exerted on ﬁrms’ technological choices by the transac-
tion costs of dealings on the credit market has been recently examined by
Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995) and Boyd and Smith (1996) within the
literature on ﬁnance and growth. These studies argue that when auditing
costs rise, ﬁrms tend to choose projects whose returns are more easily observ-
able by outside investors, and they increasingly resort to capital markets. In
this paper, by contrast, auditing costs can aﬀect the incentive for banks to
screen their applicants, as well as the interest rates that they choose, given
that they are faced with an ex-ante moral hazard problem (i. e. the ‘non-
veriﬁability’ of the technological choice made by good ﬁrms). Thus, as in
5Conversely, Rajan and Winton (1995) remark the positive eﬀects of collateral or con-
tractual clauses providing for loan covenants on the incentive for banks to conduct accurate
ex-post monitoring of ﬁrms that they have previously funded.
6Campbell and Chan (1992), the existence of both ex-ante and ex-post moral
hazard problems (the latter stemming from the non-observability of projects’
returns) produces a tendency to under-invest in safe assets (projects).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the credit game and
the role played by the legal system; Section 3 derives the form of the optimal
debt contract; Section 4 examines the relation between the eﬃciency of the
legal system and the information production; Section 5 analyses the relation
between banks’ pricing choices and ﬁrms’ technological choices; Section 6
concludes.
2 A simple banking model with costly ex-
ante and ex-post state veriﬁcation
In this section, in order to capture the basic intuitions described in the In-
troduction, we present a very stylized partial equilibrium model of the credit
market with ex-ante and ex-post costly state veriﬁcation.
Let us consider a one-period credit market consisting of N risk-neutral
entrepreneurs each of whom can undertake an investment project, and M
risk-neutral lenders (banks) competing a l` a Bertrand and raising funds at
zero interest rate. Each investment project requires one unit of resources.
Entrepreneurs have no resources on their own, so that one unit of outside
ﬁnance must be raised to fund the project. Lenders have enough capital to
ﬁnance the entrepreneurs but they do not share with them the know-how to
pursue the investment projects by themselves.
72.1 Entrepreneurs and project technologies
Any investment project generate a random return with two possible realiza-
tions: yH > 1, in case of success, and yL = 0, in case of failure. Project
return is observed by the entrepreneur, whereas it is observable by outside
ﬁnanciers only bearing some ﬁxed cost.
Investment projects, however, are heterogeneous with respect to two as-
pects: the ﬁrst (exogenous to the model) concerns the entrepreneurial ability
of individuals, the second (endogenously derived) the technology adopted
by entrepreneurs. Both of these aspects aﬀect the probability of success
of any entrepreneurial project. More precisely the probability of success is
pa(τ) = (1+τ)a, where a denotes the entrepreneur’s ability and τ the chosen
technology. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a highly stylized form of
heterogeneity where both a and τ can assume just two values: a = {b,g},
with 0 < b < g < 1, where b stands for bad entrepreneurs and g for the good
ones; τ = {0,h}, where 0 stands for the riskier technology and h for the safer
one. We assume that only good entrepreneurs have the know-how to pursue
the safer technology; hence the parameter h must be such that h ≤
1−g
g .
It follows that the probability of success of bad and good entrepreneurs is
respectively:





(1 + h)g if τ = h
g if τ = 0
(2)
The adoption of the safer technology by good entrepreneurs is costly. The
cost function is K (h) = kh. Moreover we assume that good entrepreneurs
are endowed with positive net present value (NPV) projects, but the safer
technology, when self-ﬁnanced, guarantees higher expected returns. Bad en-
trepreneurs’ projects, instead, have negative NPV. Formally this is to assume
8that:
Assumption 1. gyH > max (1, k); byH < 1.
From a societal point of view, therefore, safe projects run by good en-
trepreneurs should be always be preferred to risky projects, while neither
safe projects nor risky ones run by bad entrepreneurs should ever be funded.
The proportion of good entrepreneurs with respect to the entire entrepreneur
population is θ.
2.2 Law, Screening and Monitoring
The credit market is characterized by both ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric
information. Firstly bankers know the share of type-g entrepreneurs but they
are unable to distinguish them from the bad ones. Self-selection devices for
entrepreneurs are not available6. Conversely, the banks are endowed with
a costly screening technology: before granting a loan they may perform a
creditworthiness test resulting in a noisy signal, S, of the applicant’s ability.
Screening costs increase with the resources s ∈ [0, ∞) (expressed in terms
of eﬀort) that the banks employ in evaluating a loan application7. However,
besides s, screening costs also depend on the quality and the eﬃciency of the
6Contrary to what one might imagine, this does not follow from entrepreneurs’ zero
wealth hypothesis but it is a consequence of both the investors’ risk-neutrality hypothesis
and the linear form of expected returns function. Indeed, in this case it is easy to show
(see Scalera and Zazzaro, 1999, Proposition A, pp. 272-74) that even if ﬁrms are endowed
with positive wealth strictly smaller than the initial investment outlay, the equilibrium
standard debt contract (which is the optimal contract, as we will show later) would be of
pooling type.
7For instance, banks have to spent resources on checking and evaluating ﬁnancial state-
ments as well as on gathering extra information on the quality of the applicants’ projects.
9legal system. As stated in the Introduction, the eﬃciency of the legal system
is a highly composite variable which comprises various aspects, such as the
enforcement of property and contractual rights, bankruptcy procedures, and
the type of accounting rules. In order to handle this complexity, we reduce
the quality and eﬃciency of a legal system to a single parameter ` ∈ (0,1],
something similar to the Law and Order Index, measured by the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide or the Accounting Standard Index measured by
the International Centre for Financial Analysis and Research8. When a coun-
try’s corporate governance legislation is defective or its legal machinery does
not perform properly (i. e. the courts are not able to enforce these laws
rapidly and unambiguously) ` is low. In these cases gray economy and ‘hid-
den’ businesses are widespread, tax evasion and breaches of contracts are
common, uneven accounting practices are the order of the day and economic
dealings frequently involve corruption and nepotism. In a context of this
kind, screening the entrepreneurs’ ability becomes a highly costly activity
for banks9. Formally, we assume that screening costs increase linearly with
the screening intensity and they decrease convexly with `:




with c > 0.
The signal obtained by banks from performing a creditworthiness test can
assume only two values, i. e. S = {G,B}. Once the signal has been received,
banks must decide whether or not to grant the loan; hence the set of feasible
actions for a bank is Λ = {Y,D}, where Y denotes that the loan is granted
8These indicators have been used in several empirical studies. Among others see Knack
and Keefer (1995), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
9To simplify the analysis, we suppose that ` aﬀects only screening costs and not the
screening outcome as well.
10and D that it is denied.
The greater the resources spent by banks on screening, the more accurate
the signal becomes, i. e. the greater is the probability that a loan will
be granted to a good entrepreneur, or the lower the probability that bad
projects will be funded. Let us call Pr(G|g, s) the probability that a bank
will correctly recognize a good entrepreneur as a good one when the resources
employed in screening loan applications are s, and Pr(G|b, s) the probability
that it will erroneously evaluate a bad entrepreneur as a good one. The
probability of correctly recognizing a good or a bad entrepreneur increases
with s. More speciﬁcally, selecting an entrepreneur randomly from N, we
assume that:
Pr(G|g, s) = 1 − (1 − α)e
−γs (4)
Pr(G|b, s) = αe
−γs (5)
where γ > 0 is a parameter measuring the information content of s, whereas
α ∈ [0,1] denotes banks’ ability to recognize a good entrepreneur and (1−α)
their ability to recognize a bad one (i. e. an higher value of α denotes
an higher probability of making type-II errors and a lower probability of
making type-I errors)10. From (4) and (5) we can infer that, when s is 0, the
probability of recognizing a good entrepreneur coincides with the probability
of not recognizing a bad entrepreneur: in other words the signal received by
banks is in this case totally uninformative:
Pr(G|g, s = 0) = Pr(G|b, s = 0) = α.
In turn, at the limit, when banks employ an inﬁnite amount of resources
in their screening activity, the probability of committing type-I or type-II
10A similar screening technology has been employed, among others, by Riordan (1993),
Gehrig (1998), Zazzaro (1999).
11errors vanishes, i. e. the signal received by banks is fully informative:
lim
s→∞Pr(G|g, s) = 1 and lim
s→∞Pr(G|b, s) = 0.
Now assume that an unscreened project (i. e. a project screened at
intensity 0) has a negative net present value:
Assumption 2. [θ(1 + h)g + (1 − θ)b]yH < 1.
Assumption 2 simply states that loans granted to unscreened projects
cannot be funded by banks, even when good entrepreneurs choose the safer
technology. Consequently banks in equilibrium must exercise some positive
screening eﬀort in order for the credit market to exist.
Besides the type of borrower, banks cannot observe the returns on a
project, unless they performs a costly monitoring activity. There is now
a large body of literature on the optimal ﬁnancial contract in a costly ex-
post state veriﬁcation (CESV) environment11; the main result is that, in
a context of this kind, the optimal contract is the so-called standard debt
contract, which speciﬁes a ﬁxed non-contingent repayment (principal plus in-
terest). When the borrower fails to honor the contract, costly monitoring and
bankruptcy procedures ensue, resulting in seizure of all borrower’s earnings
from the project by the lender.
However, we assume here that due to ineﬃciency in the legal system,
when the borrower defaults the banks may not be able to extract all bor-
rower’s earnings - ascertained by means of monitoring - to which they are
contractually entitled. Indeed the amount of credit recovered by banks de-
pends on the eﬀectiveness of the legal and judicial system in protecting their
11The standard references are Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984, 1996), Gale and Hell-
wig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987).
12claims. Where bankruptcy procedures do not enforce creditors’ rights ad-
equately, or when courts are ineﬃcient, the debt recovery process may be
costly, time-consuming, and highly uncertain in its outcome. In such a situa-
tion creditors may prefer to rely on some extra-judicial ‘private’ procedures,
foregoing large parts of their credit.
From a formal point of view, we assume that for any unit of money
ascertained by the auditor and owed to him, the amount he can seize from
the borrower is just `12. The remaining (1 − `) units of money are kept by
the borrower, who can therefore take advantage of the structural ineﬃciency
of the legal system13. Conversely monitoring costs are in a ﬁxed sum of
m > 014. Drawing on the CESV literature, in the next section we shall show
that even in this enriched context the optimal ﬁnancial contract is the so-
called standard debt contract requiring a ﬁxed non-contingent repayment RH
(principal plus interest) to be speciﬁed. When the borrower defaults, costly
monitoring and bankruptcy procedures are carried out, and all borrower’s
legally available resources are seized. However, in contrast to standard CESV
models, we shall show that it is not optimal for creditors always to monitor
debtors’ default statements.
12Diﬀerently than in Diamond (1996), we assume that liquidation of debtors’ assets
does not imply any deadweight losses. However, as the optimal contract is incentive
compatible and yL = 0, it remains true that in equilibrium banks never obtain anything
from liquidation.
13Of course, ineﬃciencies of the legal and judicial system also imply some form of dead-
weight loss, like liquidation costs. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from these costs
(see note 12).
14Obviously, the ineﬃciency of the legal system or excessively ”pro-debtor” bankruptcy
procedures can also aﬀect monitoring costs. However, for the sake of simplicity, here we
assume that monitoring costs do not depend on the legal machinery performance.
132.3 The credit game
To sum up the discussion so far, banks and entrepreneurs play the following
game:
Time 0: Nature chooses the entrepreneurs’ ability and reveals it to them.
Time 1: Banks decide the loan interest rate and make their decision
public. Individuals apply for loans and choose the project technology.
Time 2: Banks screen loan applications and decide whether or not to
satisfy the demand for credit.
Time 3: Investment projects generate their returns which are privately
observed by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs announce the investment returns
to banks, which decide whether or not to audit the announcement.
The equilibrium is given by: (i) an amount of resources, s∗, devoted to
the screening of loan applications; (ii) a lending rule Λ
∗ = {λ|S = G;λ|S =
B}, for λ = Y, D; (iii) a gross interest rate RH∗ which holds the banks’
expected payoﬀ at zero; (iv) a probability (or frequency) q∗ of auditing failure
announcements by borrowers; (v) a technological choice τ = {0, h} made by
good entrepreneurs in order to maximize their expected payoﬀ.
3 The optimal debt contract
As in all CESV models, with yL = 0 as a possible project outcome, the ﬁnan-
cial contract must be such that lenders monitor their counterparts in some
states of the world. If they do not, it is always optimal for borrowers to claim
a null-return, which means banks would never recover granted loans. Con-
sequently, the contract must specify a stream of payments Rj, contingent on
the investment outcome announced by the borrower, j = {H,L}, the states
of the world in which monitoring occurs, and a stream of payments F ji con-
14tingent on both the borrower’s announcement and the monitoring outcome,
where i = {H,L} is the true cash-ﬂow realized . In that monitoring is costly,
it takes place only when the borrower declares bankruptcy, i. e. when j = L.
However, this does not imply that the lender has to monitor all bankrupted
borrowers, as is generally assumed in CESV models. Following Border and
Sobel (1987), Townsend (1988), Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Boyd and
Smith (1994), indeed, it is possible to conceive a more complex debt con-
tract where the lender commits himself to audit the borrower’s bankruptcy
announcement only stochastically15.
As far as payments Rj are concerned, given the standard limited liability
clause, we have that RL = yL = 0, and RH ≤ yH. When the borrower
defaults and the bank decides to audit, the true investment outcome is as-
certained. If a false announcement is made, the payment owed to the bank
is F LH ≤ yH (of course, F LL = yL = 0). However, although the auditing
activity reveals the true investment cash-ﬂow with certainty, the lender is
able to recoup just a portion ` of F LH.
Given the assumption of Bertrand competition among banks, the opti-
mal contract is the incentive-compatible one (inducing truthful revelation
of the state of the world by the borrower) which maximizes the borrower’s
expected payoﬀ, subject to the lender’s participation constraint. As already
pointed out, the banks need to screen loan applicants and this gives rise
to two possible results: the creditworthiness test is passed or it is failed.
Therefore, in principle, two diﬀerent contracts should be drafted, one for
type-G entrepreneurs and the other for type-B entrepreneurs. However, this
eventuality can be excluded by the following proposition.
15Obviously, the ex-ante probability that a failed borrower will be audited coincides
exactly with the frequency with which failed borrowers are audited.
15Proposition 1 If in equilibrium banks consider it convenient to devote a
positive amount of resources to the screening of loan applicants, then the
optimal lending rule is Λ∗ = {Y |S = G, D|S = B}. Otherwise, the optimal
lending rule is Λ∗∗ = {D|S = G , D|S = B} and the credit market collapses.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Assumption 2 and from the fact
that the screening technology is informative, i.e. from the fact that, applying
Bayes’ rule to (4) and (5), Pr(g|B, s∗ > 0) < θ, and Pr(b|G, s∗ > 0) < (1−θ),
where s∗ denotes the optimal screening eﬀort (to be derived below).
Hence the optimal lending rule states that banks should refuse loans to
entrepreneurs who have not passed the creditworthiness test. Consequently,
the optimal debt contract must be drafted in such a way as to maximize
the expected type-g borrowers’ payoﬀ. More precisely the optimal incentive-























= Pr(G)[b + (pg − b)Pr(g|G)]R
H+
−Pr(G)[(1 − b) − (pg − b)Pr(g|G)]qm −
c
`





H;0 ≤ q ≤ 1
where pg = pg(τ) is the probability of success of good entrepreneurs (which
assumes one of the values as in (2)), and q is the probability that the bank
audits the borrower’s failure claim. The ﬁrst constraint is designed to induce
truthful announcement from the borrower (Incentive-Compatible constraint);
16the second is necessary in order to induce the lender to accept the contract
(Participation Constraint). The last set of constraints is required to enable
the drafting of a feasible contract.
Proposition 2 Provided that the signal resulting from the screening activity
is G, the optimal payment schedule is RH∗ =
[cs∗+`Pr(G)]yH
Pr(G){(`yH+m)[(pg−b)Pr(g|G)+b]−m},
when the borrower announces ‘success’, and RL∗ = 0 when the borrower
announces ‘failure’. In the latter case the borrower’s announcement will be
audited with probability q∗ = RH∗/`yH, and if the auditing reveals a false
announcement the payment is F LH∗ = yH.
Proof. From the IC constraint the minimum auditing probability which





From the PC constraint it follows that RH is positively related to q. Hence,
the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is maximized for the minimum q-value such
that the IC constraint holds with equality, i. e. for q = q∗ and F LH = yH.
Substituting these values in the PC constraint and solving it with respect to
RH yields the payment schedule deﬁned in the Proposition
Therefore, whatever the optimal screening eﬀort, the optimal contract
is a particular kind of standard debt contract which commits the lender to
auditing the announcements by failed borrowers on a suﬃcient number of
occasions to induce them to be truthful16. Moreover the conditions stated
16To be precise, in that monitoring is costly, the problem that the contract is
renegotiation-proof may arise. Banks may indeed announce they will audit their failed
debtors with probability q∗ > 0, but then they may never do so. For the sake of simplicity
we exclude this possibility by implicitly assuming that a commitment technology exists
such that banks can credibly commit themselves to monitor failure announcements with
an exact frequency q∗.
17by the optimal contract, but not its form, depend on the technological choice
made by good entrepreneurs.
Since, as we shall show in the next section, RH∗ decreases with `, if for
` = 1 the credit market works, there will always exist a minimum legal
system eﬃciency level at which (and above which) the optimal debt contract
requires only a stochastic monitoring by the lender. Banks will therefore
monitor all failed ﬁrms only when the legal system is highly ineﬃcient. The
contention is that the more eﬃcient the auditing activity (in terms of both
monitoring costs and percentage of credits recovered), the less frequently
will it be necessary for the lender to monitor its counterparts in order to
persuade them to report the outcomes of their projects truthfully. Indeed,
even if borrowers know that there is a lower probability of being audited, they
also know that when they are audited, they will be forced to pay the lender a
higher share of their income. Thus whenever (and wherever) the legal system
and the monitoring technology are eﬃcient enough, the lender does not need
to monitor the borrower whenever the latter declares bankruptcy.
4 Information production
Thus far we have deﬁned the optimal lending rule and the optimal debt
contract. However a complete representation of the credit market equilib-
rium requires us to determine the resources that banks decide to invest in
screening their loan applicants and the technological choice made by good
entrepreneurs.
Provided banks compete ` a la Bertrand, the optimal screening intensity is
given by the value of s that minimizes the equilibrium debt face value RH∗
(i. e. the debt face value for which the bank Participation Constraint is
















b + (pg − b)Pr(g|G) −
(pg − b)Pr(G)
∂ Pr(g|G)
∂s [cs∗ + `Pr(G)]





Equation (8) is derived from the ﬁrst order condition employed to minimize
the program described in (7), assuming of course that the denominator of the
interest factor RH expression is diﬀerent from 0. The second order condition
is satisﬁed by referring to the model construction17.
Given Assumption 2, at s = 0, RH > yH. If ∂RH
∂s |s=0 < 0, then the
solution to the minimization program (7) assumes positive values. If we
denote this solution with s∗, whenever RH (s∗) > yH there is no screening
intensity s such to induce banks to participate in the credit market. In this
latter case, we may state that the solution for the minimization program is
s∗ = 0 and the credit market collapses.
Proposition 3 An improvement in the legal system eﬃciency causes a re-
duction in the equilibrium interest factor RH∗. If the net present value of an
un-screened project is not particularly negative and if the screening technol-
ogy is suﬃciently informative, then a minimum eﬃciency level of the legal
system ` ≤ 1 can be found such that the credit market exists, i. e. such that
RH(s∗) = yH.
17Indeed it is possible to show that the second derivative of the objective function with
respect to s is always positive.
19Proof. An improvement in the legal system eﬃciency leads to an increase
in banks’ expected proﬁts. It follows that when ` rises the entire relationship
between RH and s described by expression (7) shifts downwards and hence,
if s∗ > 0, RH(s∗) shrinks. Moreover, from (8) it is easy to prove that ∂`
∂γ < 0.
It follows that, if neither θ nor (pg − b) are close to 0 (i.e. if RH(0) is not
particularly larger than yH) and γ is suﬃciently high (i.e. if the screening
technology is suﬃciently informative), then a legal system eﬃciency level
` ≤ 1, above which the constraint RH(s∗) ≤ yH is satisﬁed, exists
Proposition 3 states that when the legal machinery performs satisfactorily,
the costs incurred by banks in screening and monitoring their customers are
low, and loan interest rates are on average lower than those ﬁxed by banks
in countries in which the legal system is ineﬃcient. This, however, does not
imply that the intensity with which entrepreneurs are screened by banks is
unambiguously related to the eﬃciency of the legal system. Indeed a more
eﬃcient legal system reduces marginal screening costs but it does reduce
marginal screening beneﬁts as well. The beneﬁt accruing to banks from
screening is proportional to auditing costs they are able to avoid because of
previous screening activity. An increase in ` reduces the frequency with which
banks check their borrowers’ announcements, so that accurate screening of
entrepreneurs’ ability becomes less proﬁtable. These observations motivate
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal contractual auditing frequency is always de-
creasing in `. Conversely, when marginal screening costs c are suﬃciently
high with respect monitoring costs m, the optimal screening intensity may be
decreasing in `.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of Proposition can de directly derived from equation
(6). As regards the second part, from the envelope theorem, we know that
20sign∂s∗
∂` = −sign∂2RH
∂s∂` |s=s∗. By means of equation (8), it is easy to show that
∂s∗
∂` ≷ 0 ⇔ ` ≷ b `, where
b ` =











From Bayes’s rule, Pr(g|G) =
θ[1−(1−α)e−γs]





Substituting these expressions and that for Pr(G) in b `, it follows that










Of course both the eﬃciency of the legal system and the accuracy of
screening aﬀect the amount of expected defaults on granted loans. More
precisely it is easy to demonstrate the following proposition:
Proposition 5 In equilibrium the larger the amount of information collected
by banks (i.e. the higher the screening eﬀort s∗), the smaller the proportion
of expected defaults on granted loans, de.
Proof. The share of expected defaults on loans granted by banks is given
by
d






(pg − b) < 0.
Proposition 4 states that, when the proportion of good entrepreneurs the
bank may meet is low and the legal system is highly ineﬃcient, a small im-
provement in its functioning may reduce the frequency of bank auditing so
substantially that the beneﬁts from screening loan applicants decrease more
than do the associated costs. In these circumstances, banks ﬁnd it worth-
while to rely more on the ex-post seizure of borrowers’ earnings and to reduce
their screening eﬀort. When, instead, the legal system is suﬃciently eﬃcient
and the ability of entrepreneurs is high, ex-post vetting by lenders of their
customers is unusual. It follows that a further increase in the eﬃciency of
the legal system reduces screening costs more than the relative beneﬁts, and
consequently makes it more convenient for banks to gather more ex-ante in-
formation on entrepreneurs’ ability, thereby reducing the number of expected
defaults. This means that, though in backward regions an important cause of
a badly performing credit market is often a highly rudimentary legal system,
(even non-marginal) reforms intended to improve the latter may reduce the
accuracy with which lenders screen their loan applicants, and, as a conse-
quence, increase the number of bad ﬁrms ﬁnanced. Figure 1 illustrates the
relation between s∗ and `. Assuming that the initial legal system eﬃciency
level is `0, legal reform policies may induce banks to step up their informa-
tion production activity only if these policies raise the eﬃciency level of legal
institutions to above `1.
From a more general point of view, the non-monotonic relation existing
between information production (or screening intensity) and the eﬃciency of
the legal system may suggest an interesting policy observation. In markets
22with signiﬁcant forms of asymmetric information, like the credit market, the
protection aﬀorded by non-market institutions (like the legal system) may
in some cases substitute for the self-protection devices devised by private
individuals. For this reason, policies intended to improve the eﬃciency of
those institutions may give rise to perverse eﬀects, especially when they are
of limited magnitude. If the intention is to increase the eﬃciency of the legal
system, the measures aimed to reach this goal must be conceived in order
to push this eﬃciency beyond some critical threshold, otherwise we may
be confronted with bad surprises regarding a lower eﬃciency of the credit
market.
5 Legal system eﬃciency, and technological
choices
Thus far the probability of success of good entrepreneurs has been generally
denoted with pg, a parameter which, instead, as we know, can assume two
diﬀerent values depending on chosen technology. By assumption, the safer
technology is the ﬁrst best solution pursued by good entrepreneurs if they
are able to self ﬁnance the investment. In fact, when investment project
must be funded from outside, the technology τ = h is still the optimal choice
iﬀ h(yH − RH) − k ≥ 0. This expression trivially asserts that investment
in technological improvements is worthwhile for entrepreneurs if and only if
the net gains therefrom are positive. For good entrepreneurs, therefore, the
optimal technological choice depends on the interest factor RH. In particular





h if RH ≤ R
H
= yH − k
h
0 if RH > R
H
= yH − k
h.
(10)
23Firms’ technological choices are not veriﬁable by banks, which means
that contract cannot be made contingent on them. This aspect gives rise
to a second potential moral hazard problem in the model. If the loan in-
terest rate announced by banks is too high, then entrepreneurs will ﬁnd it
convenient to declare their decision to adopt the safer technology although,
once the loan has been granted, they will not make the investment necessary
to implement it. However the probability distribution of any type of project
return as well as the distribution of the entrepreneurs’ population is common
knowledge. Bankers are consequently aware of the existence of the potential
moral hazard problem mentioned above. In other words, banks know that
if the equilibrium interest factor is lower than R
H
entrepreneurs will choose
the safer technology, otherwise they will opt for the riskier one. Thus the
assessment of any bank will be that, given the optimal debt contract, the





(1 + h)g if RH∗ ≤ R
H




Proposition 6 There exists a legal system eﬃciency level e ` > ` such that










Pr(G){(`yH+m)[(g−b)Pr(g|G)+b]−m} if ` ≤ b `
[cs+`Pr(G)]yH
Pr(G){(`yH+m)[((1+h)g−b)Pr(g|G)+b]−m} if ` > b `
(12)
Proof. The proposition trivially follows from the observation that, from
(10), from R
H
< yH and, from Proposition 3, ∂RH∗
∂` < 0.
[Insert Figure 2]
The relationship between the equilibrium interest rate on the credit mar-
ket and the eﬃciency of the legal system is thus a discontinuous function as
24represented in Figure 2. Of course this discontinuity stems from our hypoth-
esis that there are only two types of entrepreneur and two types of technol-
ogy. More generally, however, if we assume the existence of a continuum of
technologies available to an entrepreneur, the interest rate will be much more
elastic to the eﬃciency level of the legal system than in the case entrepreneurs
do not have any technological choice. Indeed, a legal reform which introduces
more eﬃcient rules and better-performing judicial institutions induces banks
to lower the interest rate. But this in turn makes it convenient for some ﬁrms
to invest in safer (or more productive) technologies, giving rise to a further
reduction in the interest rate.
It follows that high interest rates and a large proportion of non-performing
loans which typify weak regions may not necessarily be due to low average
entrepreneurial ability or to a very strong market power of the banks them-
selves. This evidence may instead be due to an ineﬃcient legal machinery
which incentives lenders to increase interest rates, thereby inducing ﬁrms to
undertake riskier investment projects.
Nonetheless, apart from the interest factor, the probability of success of
good entrepreneurs also aﬀects the screening strategy of banks.
Proposition 7 : If the marginal screening costs c/` are high, the optimal
screening intensity s∗ decreases when entrepreneurs adopt the safer technol-
ogy.
Proof. As before, from the envelope theorem, we know that sign∂s∗
∂pg =
−sign∂2RH
∂s∂pg |s=s∗. By diﬀerentiating the implicit equation (8)18 it is easy to
18Of course, in principle, given that only two level of pg exist in our model, we cannot
use diﬀerential calculus. However, since the sign of the derivative does not depend on pg,




















αγ (1 − θ)

θ − (θ − α)e−γs∗
e−γs∗
[(1 − (1 − α)e−γs∗)][θ − (θ − α)(1 + s∗γ)e−γs∗] − s∗αγ (1 − θ)e−γs∗.
Therefore, when the marginal screening costs are low, then an ineﬃcient
legal system which determines an equilibrium interest factor above R
H
-
thereby inducing good entrepreneurs to choose riskier projects - will cause
a lower information production on entrepreneurs’ ability and consequently,
recalling Proposition 5, a higher observed default share in the economy. If,
instead, the marginal costs of screening are high, the ineﬃciency of the legal
system on the one hand induces good ﬁrms to opt for riskier businesses, giving
rise to a reduction in pg, while on the other, it makes it worthwhile for banks
to devote greater eﬀort to screening, exactly because of this contemporary
pg reduction. Again, in this case we reach the paradoxically conclusion that
the ineﬃciency of the legal system has an ambiguous eﬀect on the credit
market’s performance (in terms of the average quality of ﬁnanced projects)
and on the average share of non-performing loans: good ﬁrms choose the
riskier technology, which is ineﬃcient from the social welfare point of view;
but at the same time the percentage of bad ﬁrms that obtain credit decreases.
266 Conclusions
Recent empirical researches have convincingly shown that the structure of
the legal system and its eﬃcient operation inﬂuence the ﬁnancial structure
of ﬁrms, their ability to gain access to capital markets, and the growth of eco-
nomic systems. This article used a simple banking model with ex-ante and
ex-post information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders to analyse
the eﬀects that the eﬃciency of the legal system may exert on the perfor-
mance of the credit market. Its main conclusions have been that (i) when the
legal system is eﬃcient, loan interest rates are lower; (ii) a large amount of
defaults on loans may be due not only to a pool of low-skilled entrepreneurs or
to the market power of banks but also to a legal system unable to adequately
protect the credit rights of banks; (iii) if improvement in the eﬃciency of the
legal institutions is to have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on bank screening procedures,
and on their accurate selection of ﬁrms, the eﬃciency of the legal system
must exceed a certain threshold level.
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North 57 19 71 65 18 51 11
Centre 68 20 72 55 12 49 9
South 72 26 76 59 28 41 14
Source: Generale and Gobbi (1997, p. 201).
Table 2. Factors causing the length of debt collection*








North West 1,84 2,67 1,61 1,57 1,30
North East 1,61 2,60 1,72 1,40 1,19
Centre 1,75 2,78 1,70 1,63 1,26
South 1,95 2,87 1,65 1,85 1,11
Italy 1,79 2,73 1,67 1,61 1,22
Source: Generale and Gobbi (1997, p. 198).
* 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Important; 3 = Very Important. s
*
1 0 l 0 l l ˆ 1 l l
Figure 1. The Efficiency of the legal system and the optimal screening intensity   R
H






Figure 2. The Efficiency of the legal system and the loan interest rate